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Abstract:  
A key element of government is to uphold law and order. This paper will evaluate the 
impact of slow judiciaries on entrepreneurship. In 2002 a judicial reform was 
implemented in 6 of Pakistan’s 117 districts to facilitate rapid case disposal. Drawing 
on a panel dataset of 875 district judges’ performance between 2001 and 2003, a 
difference-in-differences analysis shows that judges disposed of 25 percent more 
cases thanks to the reform. Three rounds of the Labour Force Surveys will be then 
used to show that the reform improved security of property rights, encouraged people 
to seek loans, fostered entrepreneurship and was associated with increased 
transition from unemployment and paid employment to entrepreneurship. 
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I Introduction
This paper presents new evidence on the impact of judiciaries on entrepreneurship
using original judge-level data as well as detailed microeconomic data on entrepreneur-
ship gathered following an innovative 2002 reform of Pakistans judiciary. Literature
on the subject has yet to provide clear empirical evidence of judiciaries impact on
economic activity. A key question in this literature is causation, since institutions are
arguably endogenous. This paper, in contrast, focuses on a dramatic change in Pak-
istans judicial system in order to identify the latters impact on entrepreneurship. To
reduce the enormous backlog of court cases, Pakistan enacted a judicial reform entitled
the "Access to Justice Programme", which was conducted by the Asian Development
Bank in 2002. Caseow management techniques were taught to civil and criminal judges
in 6 pilot districts out of 117 with the explicit objective of facilitating rapid case dis-
posal. To assess whether the reform a¤ected judgesperformance, I assembled a panel
dataset containing the performance of Pakistans 875 judges between 2001 and 2003.
A di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis shows that judges disposed of 25 percent more cases
following the reform in a¤ected districts.
This judicial reform may potentially a¤ect entrepreneurship, which is key for eco-
nomic growth [Schumpeter, 1934; Aghion and Howitt, 1997], and is thus a matter of
rst-order importance. First, e¢ cient judiciaries that swiftly punish law violations may
improve entrepreneurs condence in their property rights by minimizing disruptions
to economic activity. Second, judiciaries that swiftly punish defaulters may improve
bankscondence in their ability to recover loans and increase the credit supply nec-
essary to support entrepreneurship [Banerjee and Newman, 1993]. To test these two
mechanisms, three rounds of Pakistans Labour Force Surveys, collected in 2000, 2002
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and 2004 and containing extremely detailed data on entrepreneurship, are used in a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis comparing individualseconomic behavior in districts
where the reform was implemented with those where it was not, before and after the
reform. As the reform was widely discussed and criticized in numerous newspaper ar-
ticles mentioned below, it is likely that individuals knew about this reform and that
short-term perceptions about the judiciary changed.
The main ndings can be summarized as follows. First, the judicial reform elimi-
nated law and order situations preventing people from working1, a reason cited by 10
percent of the population when prevented from working. This may spur entrepreneur-
ship by creating conditions conducive to business and improve entrepreneurscondence
that their workforce will not be prevented from working due to law and order situations.
Second, willingness to arrange for nancial resources or to apply for loans on the part
of the unemployed actively looking for work almost doubled in a¤ected districts. Indi-
viduals were more condent in their ability to obtain credit when unemployed. Both
mechanisms spurred entrepreneurship. The proportion of the unemployed applying for
permits or seeking land, building, machinery to establish enterprises tripled thanks to
the reform. This translated into a one third increase in the transition from being unem-
ployed to being an employer or own account worker. There was a similar increase in the
number of transitions from being an employee to an employer or own account worker.
One of this papers key concerns is non-random reform placement, which could poten-
tially a¤ect the common time e¤ects assumption according to which judges and individ-
uals in a¤ected areas, had they not been a¤ected, would have evolved in the same way as
judges and individuals in non-a¤ected areas. I address this concern in three ways. First,
I explicitly test this assumption by examining the evolution of judgesperformance and
individualsbehavior in a¤ected and non-a¤ected areas one year before implementation
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of the reform. Second, the reform placement was an explicit function of the extent of the
local judiciarys pre-reform slowness. Thus, the estimate could potentially confound the
reforms e¤ects with the mean reversion that would have taken place in its absence. An
interacted term between reform placement and the initial level of cases pending in 2001
is included in the regressions in order to account for potential mean reversion. Third,
the common time e¤ects assumption is equivalent to saying that there are no omitted
time-varying and district-specic e¤ects correlated with the reform. I account for factors
such as police strength in order to disentangle the reforms e¤ects from any coincidental
evolution in the police forces.
Empirical literature on the impact of judiciaries is limited. Djankov et al [2003]
have made an important contribution to the study of the courts. Measuring judicial
formalism in 109 countries, they found it to be greater in countries with civil rather
than common law systems and associated with a lack of consistency, honesty and fairness
in judicial decisions. Endogeneity concerns were addressed by using legal origin as an
instrument for judicial formalism. This paper di¤ers from that of Djankov et al [2003]
in three ways. First, it uses a within-country analysis of Pakistan. By limiting myself
to one country, I am able to account for a range of factors and inuences that cannot
be as convincingly accounted for in cross-country data. This allows me to identify the
e¤ects of judicial e¢ ciency independently of laws, legal origins and other country-wide
characteristics. Second, the paper focuses not only on judicial but economic outcomes.
Third, it generates clear policy implications regarding the desirability of such reforms.
Visaria [2006] exploits variation in spread of debt tribunals and in likely impact
across rms to show that a tribunal establishment reduced loan delinquency by 3 to 10
percent. Related to the outcomes studied in this paper, Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer
[1997] relate the quality of legal institutions to the size of the uno¢ cial economy proxied
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by the di¤erence between electricity consumption (proxying for total economic activity)
and o¢ cial GDP. No attempt has been made to deal with the potential endogeneity of
judicial ine¢ ciency. Friedman et al [2000] perform a similar analysis using instrumental
variables such as long-standing linguistic fractionalization, the origins of the legal system,
the religious composition of the population, and geographic location to show that when
faced with a weak legal system, businesses hide their activities underground. Aside
from the credibility of such instruments, the usual criticisms of cross-country studies
regarding sample size (69 countries) and the accuracy of business perception measures
regarding the rule of law still apply. Frye and Zhuravskaya [2000] gather a dataset
on courts perceptions and private protection. They measure court performance by
asking 230 small shopkeepers in three Russian cities whether, in the previous two years,
they needed to use courts but chose not to. They relate this measure to contacts with
private protection. They nd that court e¢ cacy is inversely related to the incidence
of contacts with the private protection racket. They conclude that cities with weaker
legal institutions are likely to be less attractive to small businesses. Similarly, using
rm-level data, Johnson et al [2000] nd weak evidence that the ability of the legal
system to enforce contracts a¤ects entrepreneursdecisions on whether or not to hide
their activity. These two papers make no attempt to deal with the potential endogeneity
of judicial ine¢ ciency. For example, one might wonder why perception of the judiciary
varies within the same city or country. Shopkeepers with a better perception of the
judiciary might be more politically connected. This would impact their operations in
the o¢ cial sector. Finally, Djankov et al [2006] gather a survey of 414 entrepreneurs
and 561 non-entrepreneurs in seven Chinese cities. They investigate the sociological,
individual and institutional determinants of entrepreneurship. They nd that 15 percent
of entrepreneurs blame ine¢ cient courts as a key institutional obstacle in doing business,
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as compared to 38 percent of non-entrepreneurs. But this could equally be due to the fact
that cities with economic policies favouring entrepreneurship also have better courts or
that individuals with a better perception of the courts have a natural inclination toward
entrepreneurship.
In contrast to the above-mentioned literature, I use a clear identication strategy
to isolate the impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship. I also use detailed micro-
economic information to test two mechanisms through which the judiciary could a¤ect
entrepreneurship.
The papers structure is as follows. Section 2 provides a background on Pakistans
judicial system and reform. Section 3 discusses the theoretical impact of the judiciary
on entrepreneurship. Section 4 presents the data, method and results pertaining to the
impact of the reform on judicial e¢ ciency. Section 5 relates the spatial and temporal
variation in judicial quality to entrepreneurship. Section 6 concludes.
II Background
In order to understand the source of variation in judicial speed used in the empir-
ical section, it is useful to examine the state of Pakistans judiciary, as well as certain
institutional details regarding the countrys judicial reform of 2002.
II.1 Pakistans Judiciary
More than 1.2 million cases were pending in Pakistan on the 1st of January 2002 in
subordinate courts only. It was taking approximately 2 years to treat any case. Some
anecdotes are even more striking.
Haider, a law student, was 23 when he was rst arrested. The charges against him
were serious, ranging from dacoity (armed robbery) and possession of explosives and
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ammunition, to murder. He claims that all charges were fabricated at the behest of a
disgruntled police o¢ cer. Haider is now a 41 and has only recently been set free2.
Many of the under-trial prisoners had been in prison for periods longer than the term
they would have served, had they been convicted,a¢ rms Syed Liaquat Banori, head of
the prisonersrights body the Society for the Protection of Human Rights and Prisoners
Aid. Over 17,000 cases remained pending before the countrys Apex (Supreme) Court
on January 1 2003, according to the annual report of the Law and Justice Commission of
Pakistan (LJCP) released in October 2004. This report also claims that more than a mil-
lion cases were pending in all high and subordinate courts by the same date. According
to legal experts, dispensation of justice in Pakistan has remained awed, delayed and in
some cases non-existent. The Law Minister claims the situation is even worse regarding
civil cases: It takes years to conclude a case and sometimes, the remedy gets diluted.
Legal experts say much remains to be done to reduce delays in the administration of
justice3. Monstrous backlog exist throughout the courts with chronic delays in disposal
of cases of ve, ten, even twenty-plus years. In one court we surveyed the grand-children
of the original litigants was continuing to dispute an interest in land some sixty years
after institution of proceedings, according to Livingston Armytage, a legal expert from
the Centre for Judicial Studies4. He further adds that the problem of delay in civil
cases is severe, particularly in commercial cases which tend on average to take 4.5 years
to complete. In the Sindh High Court, however, this period extends to almost ten years,
and property litigation to almost 7 years. Isolated cases considerably in excess of these
delays are not altogether apocryphal5.
Criminal Court judges, in a report discussing the design and operation of delay
reduction e¤orts at the Federal Judicial Academy on June 1-3, 2001, highlighted several
reasons for these delays. Cases are not managed properly. The Courtsministerial sta¤
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is not properly trained and most of the Presiding O¢ cers time is wasted attending to
petty matters. Courts are insu¢ ciently equipped. Criminal case reports are submitted
after inordinate delays despite the fact that, according to Section 173 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, it is obligatory for investigating o¢ cers to present reports in Court and
have jurisdiction within 3 days after the required 14 following registration of the case.
Under-trial prisoners are not presented in court on the date of hearings6. Prosecution
fails to produce witnesses in time. There is an alarmingly high volume of cases pending
before Magistrates and Learned Sessions Judges do not transfer cases in equal number
to Judicial Magistrates. A large number of courts are vacant and without any presiding
o¢ cer.
Civil Court judges produced a similar report in which they argue that cases are not
properly managed (admission of plaints not requiring trial, service of summons not prop-
erly controlled by baili¤s, excessive time spent ling written statements, issues framed
by courts posterior to fteen days of ling written statements, unnecessary adjournments
encouraged by cost impositions, evidence not allowed by a¢ davits, judges failing to en-
sure that executing decrees not be unduly delayed). The number of Courts in comparison
to the number of cases is inadequate, resulting in delayed case disposal. The working
capacity of the existing courts is low due to inadequate remunerations, ine¢ cient sta¤
and insu¢ cient equipment.
II.2 The Judicial Reform of 2002
The dreadful state of Pakistani courts spurred the government to implement the Access
to Justice Programme (AJP), which sought to raise the quality of institutions administer-
ing justice, their public accountability and performance. The Asian Development Bank
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provided a $350 million assistance package to the AJP. The programme was launched in
December 2001 and implemented by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights.
The reforms most important component was a Delay Reduction Project in the Dis-
trict Courts. Its objective was to develop and implement a management plan based on
an analysis of completed cases and backlog, and the introduction of appropriate case
processing standards, manual record management and case-ow management systems.
The crucial point for our analysis was the implementation of the reform in a limited
number of pilot courts. The rationale behind pilot courts was to change the prevailing
legal culture as outlined in the Technical Assistance Report 3015, a seven-month study
of Legal and Judicial Reform in Pakistan7. Ten subordinate court judges (seven civil and
three criminal) in three large urban centres (Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar) were part
of a pilot project testing the e¢ cacy of caseow management principles in addressing the
long delays and large backlogs endemic to the countrys trial courts8. The ten judges were
not selected randomly. The selection process considered the judgesstanding within the
legal community, their willingness to participate in an experimental programme, their
level of judicial experience and the leadership their superiors would provide for them
during the projects duration. Nor were the three targeted areas selected randomly.
Livingston Armytage notes that
in order to maximize the e¤ective delivery of project resources to focus-
ing on the major problem of delay, it is proposed to focus on those courts
where delay is most substantial and chronic, that is Peshawar, Lahore and
Karachi.9
The number of cases pending at the beginning of 2001 would appear to be the
criterion used in choosing a¤ected areas. This non-random programme placement is to
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be kept in mind when examining the empirical analysis.
The Delay Reduction Project consisted in three steps. First, the ten judges visited
Singapores "state of the art" Subordinate Courts10. Second, they received training at
Islamabads Federal Judicial Academy in the form of ve three-days workshops orga-
nized every three months from June 1 2001 to October 27 2002 on case management
techniques. Appendix 1 describes in more detail these techniques. Third, a bench/bar
liaison committee was established in each pilot project area to develop and monitor
operations, and organize regular meetings and workshops for pilot court judges so that
judges and lawyers could share their experiences11.
Features other than delay reduction were included in this reform12. However, actors
involved in this reform argue that the pilot project on delay reduction was the reforms
most substantial outcome and that this component was the most visible aspect of the
project to date.
II.3 Criticisms
The most compelling criticism to this type of reform is that it was not accompanied by
change in incentives. If we assume that judges are rational and thus understand their
incentives well, then delays are not caused by systematic "incorrect" case management
by judges. Were such a reform not accompanied by any change of incentives, then
"training" district judges would have no impact whatsoever. It is therefore necessary to
assess the reforms impact on judicial outcomes before examining economic outcomes.
Other criticisms focus on unaddressed priorities. Adnan Mahmood, in his article
Can the expensive Access to Justice Programme make the dispensation of justice more
e¤ective?, reports that Hamid Khan, of the Supreme Court Bar Association, does
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not think that such a huge investment can succeed in assuring fair and prompt trials.
He believes that justice dispensation cannot be made timely unless the entire system
is changed to ensure an independent judiciary in the country. Only an independent
judiciary can be an e¤ective judiciary things will not change for the better no matter
how many foreign trainers we hire or how many procedural changes we try to bring in.
Retired Justice Malik Muhammad Qayyum of the Lahore High Court states that
drastic change in codes and laws is required to improve the e¢ ciency of courts: The
Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, for example, need changes to a large extent. How
can we expect laws formulated in 1908 to be e¤ective for courts today? We follow English
laws. The courts in the UK have changed their laws almost entirely but we continue to
follow the same set of codes and procedures.
Hamid Khan attacks the projects basic requirement: Pakistan simply cannot af-
ford this big a loan. Rs. 20 billion is way too high a price to pay for improving the
dispensation of justice which is a state duty in the rst place. Even after spending
this heavy an amount, years from now we will see nothing will have changed as far as
dispensation of justice is concerned13.
Critics argue that the reform should have included changes in incentives, steps to-
wards an independent judiciary and a revision of laws and procedures. It is therefore
interesting to evaluate its impact on judgesperformance14.
III Theory
If we assume for now that the reform a¤ected judgesperformance, it will also be
interesting to describe the potential impact of judicial e¢ ciency on economic activity.
The judicial reforms rst intuitive consequence would be increased provision of law and
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order to agents. The judiciary is an important deterrent to fraud or crime that might
be more economically attractive in the short run. The probability of harsh punishment
in monetary or non-monetary terms heavily dissuades opportunistic agents from com-
mitting such infractions. Slower judiciaries lower the discounted value of punishment,
thereby weakening incentives to act in accordance to laws. I will test this prediction by
evaluating the reforms impact on law and order situations preventing individuals from
working last week.. If the reform is e¤ective and speeds up the courts, the discounted
value of punishment is higher and law and order situations should occur less frequently.
This would have important economic consequences. First, these situations directly pre-
vent people from working. Second, this may a¤ect the security of property rights of
entrepreneurs who might be discouraged from starting a business and encouraged, at
least as a natural response, to enter the uno¢ cial sector by hiring private protection.
Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer [1997] investigate this latter claim in a simple model
linking tax revenues, the quantity of law and order provided and the size of the unof-
cial economy. According to this model, the government chooses a level of law and
order provision. This a¤ects rmsanticipated prots since law and order increases the
productivity of rms in the o¢ cial sector. Firms may decide to stay in the o¢ cial sector
and pay taxes but also benet from government-provided public goods such as courts
and police. Or they may opt for the uno¢ cial sector and choose to pay fees to private
protection agencies providing protection from thieves and contract enforcement instead
of o¢ cial taxes. A rms decision to operate in the o¢ cial or uno¢ cial sector has impli-
cations for government nances. Firms operating in the o¢ cial sector increase budget
revenue and thus make government better able to provide law and order. The model
produces two stable equilibria. In one, the size of the uno¢ cial economy is small and
the level of law and order high. In another, the size of the uno¢ cial economy is big,
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making it impossible for governments to maintain e¢ cient legal systems. In an unstable
equilibrium both types of rms coexist. As a result of an exogenous increase in the level
of law and order provided, more rms might be attracted to the o¢ cial economy by
displacing the location of the unstable equilibrium.
This logic generates a testable implication. The reform, if e¤ective, would increase
the speed of the judiciary, providing more protection and better contract enforcement.
I will evaluate its impact on the probability of a rm keeping written accounts, using
this as a proxy for its belonging to the o¢ cial sector.
Field [2006] examines one aspect of welfare gains to property titling, namely the e¤ect
of improvements in tenure security on labour supply and labour allocation decisions
within households. This reasoning can be extended to the judiciary. A key function
of the latter is to reduce the likelihood of forced eviction by landlords, government or
other residents. Even if tenants have formal claims to land, slow judiciaries make the
discounted value of punishment due to landlordsforced eviction small. With ine¢ cient
judiciaries, households may choose to expend their own human resources in order to
solidify their land claims. E¢ cient judiciaries could free up hours of work previously
devoted to maintaining security through informal means. They could also a¤ect the
opportunity cost of employment outside the home. Security of property rights might
encourage entrepreneurship outside the home.
This logic implies that judicial reform should a¤ect the probability of working within
ones home rather than without. I will test this hypothesis using information on the
exact location of individualsworkplaces.
An entirely di¤erent channel through which the judiciary might a¤ect entrepreneur-
ship is credit markets. We may also believe that judicial systems impact rmsdebt
contracts. Pagano et al [2005] explain that the key function of courts in credit relation-
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ships is to force solvent borrowers to repay when they fail to do so spontaneously. By
the same token, poor judicial enforcement increases opportunistic behavior in borrow-
ers: anticipating that creditors will not be able to recover their loans easily and cheaply
via courts, borrowers are more tempted to default. Creditors respond to this strate-
gic behavior by reducing credit availability. Credit markets a¤ect occupational choice
[Banerjee and Newman, 1993].
In Banerjee and Newmans model, there are four occupational options: subsistence
(investment in safe assets), working (earning a certain wage from entrepreneurs), self-
employment (investment in risky projects) and entrepreneurship (investment in a number
of projects similar to self-employment projects and monitoring of workers). Wealth is
distributed unequally. Agents can borrow by using their initial wealth as collateral.
Agents can repay on time or renege and incur nes. This forces banks to restrict credit
supply and lend only to those with su¢ cient collateral. Banerjee and Newman thus
conclude that only the wealthy can be self-employed and only the wealthiest can be
entrepreneurs. We can extend this analysis by incorporating judicial e¢ ciency. In the
model, a ne is a constant. I argue that a speedier judiciary can make the discounted
value of this ne higher. This will discourage borrowers from defaulting and lower the
wealth threshold for being self-employed or an entrepreneur.
This model generates two testable implications. First, individuals might have better
access to nancial institutions spurring entrepreneurship. In the dataset, I do not know
whether individuals obtained loans. However, I do know which unemployed individuals
arranged for nancial resources or applied for loans or credit during the last year. The
judicial reform, if e¢ cient, should make individuals more condent in obtaining loans
and thus spur their demand. Second, in a¤ected areas there should be more transitions
towards becoming self-employed and an employer following the reform.
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I have seen in this section that judiciaries spur entrepreneurship through two mech-
anisms. First, they increase security of property rights and investment condence. Sec-
ond, they facilitate access to credit markets. Following Banerjee and Newman, we should
see more transitions from unemployment to self-employment and entrepreneurship, more
transitions from employment to self-employment and entrepreneurship, and even more
transitions from self-employment to entrepreneurship. Since I know in the dataset the
occupational choices both at the time of the survey and a year before. I am able to test
these transition predictions.
IV Impact of the Reform on Judicial E¢ ciency
Considering the criticisms raised by the reform, it is necessary rst to evaluate its
impact on judgesperformance. Its description makes clear that only 10 civil and crim-
inal judges in 6 districts were a¤ected by it. It is impossible to identify the a¤ected
judges in the data being used. However, Carl Baar, who is in charge of project evalua-
tion, notes that the involvement of the four District Judges in the Karachi City Court
Complex allowed the pilot project to move beyond its original focus on individual Judges
to consider the possibility of backlog reduction in entire districts15. The possibility of
spillover e¤ects allows us to consider the districts in which the a¤ected judges operate
as a¤ected units. This will represent a conservative estimate of the reform. I will use a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis to evaluate the reforms impact on the performance of
district judges. Pakistans judiciary includes a Supreme Court, 4 provincial High Courts,
and other lesser courts exercising civil and criminal jurisdiction in 117 districts. In every
provincial district, there is a Court of District Judge which is the main court of original
jurisdiction in civil matters. Besides the latter, there are Courts of Civil Judges which
try cases where the value of suits does not exceed a specied amount. In every district,
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there is also a Court of Sessions Judge (for o¤ences punishable by death) and Courts
of Magistrates (for o¤ences not punishable by death) to try criminal cases. I will rst
describe the dataset, then explain the methodology and nally discuss the results.
IV.1 Data
A panel data set at the district judge level between 2001 and 2003 was constructed
using the annual reports published by the Lahore and Peshawar High Courts and the
High Courts of Balochistan and Sindh between 2001 and 2003. These provide a wealth
of information on both High and Subordinate Courts. In particular they include a
consolidated statement of cases (number of cases pending at the beginning of the period,
led and disposed of during the period, and pending at the end of the period) for each
judge in each Subordinate Court.
2783 such statements were gathered at the judge level between 2001 and 2003. Names
of judges were not available. However, judge-year observations could be matched to-
gether by exploiting a key redundancy in the data: that the number of cases pending
at the end of a period for a judge must be equal to the number of cases pending at
the beginning of the following period for the same judge. A judge-year observation is
matched with another if the rank, town, district and province of operation were the same
and if the number of cases pending at the end of a period was equal to the number of
cases pending at the beginning of the next one. I took the liberty of matching judge-year
observations together in cases where rank, town, district and province of operation were
the same and where the number of cases pending at the end of a period was equal to
the number of cases pending at the beginning of the following period plus or minus one.
According to this matching strategy, there are 752 judges with observations in 2001 and
2002, 358 judges with observations in 2002 and 2003 and 261 judges with observations
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in 2001, 2002 and 2003 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of the variables used and
the source of data).
IV.2 Method
A reform focused on delay reduction should be associated with an increase in the number
of cases disposed of by judges thanks to better caseow management techniques. This
will thus be the main dependent variable. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis is used,
as illustrated in Figure 1. This gure presents the mean number of cases disposed
of per judge in a¤ected districts as opposed to the mean number of cases disposed
of per judge in non-a¤ected districts between 2001 and 2003. The 2002 reform was
only implemented in pilot districts. The performance of judges diverges greatly after
2002. This visual intuition is conrmed by the simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis
in Table 2. Column (1) shows the mean number of cases disposed of per judge in 2001
for a¤ected and non-a¤ected areas. Judges in the former disposed of slightly more cases
than in non-a¤ected areas prior to the reform, but this di¤erence is of little signicance.
Column (2) shows the mean number of cases disposed of per judge in 2003 for a¤ected
and non-a¤ected areas. Judges in the former disposed of more cases than in the latter
following the reform. This di¤erence is misleading in the sense that judges in a¤ected
areas are perhaps systematically di¤erent from those in non-a¤ected areas. Column (3)
shows the di¤erence between judges in the same areas between 2001 and 2003. Again
this di¤erence is misleading since judges might have solved more cases even without the
reform. Only the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate in Column (3) Row (3) is accurate.
Judges in a¤ected areas in 2003 disposed of an average of 587.59 cases due to the reform.
This e¤ect is huge considering that Pakistani judges disposed of an average of 720 cases
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per year between 2001 and 2003.
The advantage of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is that it deals with any pre-
existing systematic di¤erence between a¤ected and non-a¤ected areas. The programme
was implemented in the three biggest cities of Pakistan. One could argue that judges
in these three biggest cities are of higher quality because such jobs are in high demand.
A di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach including judge xed e¤ects accounts for systematic
di¤erence in judgesquality. However, a key assumption in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach is that of common time e¤ects: it is assumed that judges in a¤ected areas, had
they not been a¤ected, would have evolved in the same way as judges in non-a¤ected
areas. We address this concern in three ways. First, I explicitly test this assumption by
looking at the evolution of judgesperformance in a¤ected and non-a¤ected areas before
implementation of the reform. In Figure 1 we see that there was no di¤erence in the
evolution of judgesperformance before 2002. I further account for pre-reform judge per-
formance in all regressions. Second, the placement of the reform was an explicit function
of the extent of the judiciarys slowness prior to the reform. The estimate could thus
potentially confound the reforms e¤ects with the mean reversion having taken place
in its absence. I will include in the regressions an interacted term between the reform
placement and initial level of cases pending in 2001 so as to account for potential mean
reversion. Third, the common time e¤ects assumption is equivalent to a¢ rming that
there are no omitted time-varying and district-specic e¤ects correlated with the reform.
I account for factors such as police strength in order to disentangle the reformse¤ects
from coincidental evolution in the police forces.
We will now perform regressions of the form:
disposedit = i + t + 1reformi  2003 + 2reformi  2002 + xit + uit (1)
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where i corresponds to judge i, t to year t between 2001 and 2003. i is a judge xed
e¤ect, t a time xed e¤ect. reformi is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for judges
in the following districts: Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi South, Karachi West, Karachi East
and Karachi Central. To perform a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis, this term must be
interacted with the year in which the reform was supposed to bear fruits (2003). I also
include an interacted term between the reform and the year 2002 to explicitly account for
the common time e¤ects assumption. Level terms are already included in the year xed
e¤ects and in the judge xed e¤ects (a Reform variable equal to 1 in the a¤ected districts
is a linear combination of district dummies, which are themselves a linear combination
of judge xed e¤ects). xit are control variables, uit are disturbance terms. The standard
errors are clustered at the level of districts to account for concerns over serial correlation
[Bertrand et al, 2002]. The judge xed e¤ect captures the invariant ability of judges to
solve cases. It also controls for district-specic factors such as culture and geography
since a district dummy would be a linear combination of judge dummies. The year e¤ects
capture common shocks such as central amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure
which occurred during the reform as well as other centrally implemented policies. The
coe¢ cient of interest is 1. The coe¢ cient 2 should not be signicantly di¤erent from
0 if the common time e¤ects assumption is to hold.
IV.3 results
Table 3 shows the basic results regarding the impact of the judicial reform on judges.
Column (1) provides a simple conrmation that there is non-random programme place-
ment. The dataset is restricted to the 752 judges with an observation in 2001. The
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the judge operates in one of the
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6 a¤ected districts. The explanatory variable is the number of cases pending at the
beginning of 2001 per judge. There is a positive correlation between the number of cases
pending and the placement of the reform. The reform has in fact targeted areas with
higher arrears. Column (2) shows a simple pooled regression that does not take into
account the panel structure of the observations. There are 2782 observations. To per-
form a correct di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis, we included a Reform variable equal to
1 in the a¤ected districts (Karachi East, South, West and Central, Lahore and Peshawar
for Civil and Criminal Courts). We also included year xed e¤ects for 2001, 2002 and
2003. Finally, we included an interaction variable between the reform and the year 2003.
This is the di¤erence-in-di¤erences coe¢ cient. Judges in a¤ected areas disposed of 675
more cases as a direct result of the reform. A concern arising from Column (1) is the
possibility of mean reversion operating in a¤ected areas. I therefore include in Column
(3) an interacted term between the number of cases pending per judge at the beginning
of 2001 and the placement of the reform. This variable positively a¤ects the number of
cases disposed of per judge. This is evidence of mean reversion. However, the impact
of the reform remains signicant. Judges in a¤ected areas disposed of 444 more cases
because of the reform. To deal with common time e¤ects, I account for the performance
of judges in a¤ected and non a¤ected areas prior to the reform in Column (4). I include
an interacted term between the treatment of a judge and the year 2002. This coe¢ cient
is not signicantly di¤erent from 0. Moreover, the reforms impact varies little. Judges
in a¤ected areas did not evolve di¤erently from judges in non-a¤ected areas prior to
the reform. Column (5) adds rank dummies. There are 6 possible ranks for judges
in Pakistans judiciary: District and Sessions Judge, Additional District and Sessions
Judge, Senior Civil Judge, Civil Judge, Judicial Magistrate and an omitted category
(City Judge, Accountability Judge, Qazi). Accounting for rank e¤ects, judges disposed
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of 439 more cases because of the reform. A more convincing way to account for judges
quality is to include judge xed e¤ects. We exploit the longitudinal aspect of the dataset
in Column (6) by including judge dummies16. The impact of the reform drops consid-
erably. Accounting for judgesability, a trainedjudge will dispose of 166 more cases.
This indicates that judges are of better quality in a¤ected areas, which correspond to
Pakistans three biggest cities. This seems logical as such jobs are likely to be in high
demand. Judges would have disposed of more cases even without the reform in a¤ected
areas. However, the impact of the reform remains statistically and economically sig-
nicant since Pakistani judges disposed of on average 720 cases per year between 2001
and 2003. This result is robust to the inclusion of certain district time-varying control
variables. We include in Column (7) the number of police posts by district to account
for the polices importance in enforcing law and order, the number of cinemas by district
and their seating capacities by district in order to account for the overall development
of a particular district17.
It is also useful to look at di¤erent judgesoutcomes in order to fully understand the
reforms impact. Figure 2 shows the average number of cases led per judge before and
after the reform in a¤ected and non-a¤ected districts. The reform appears to have a
positive impact on the number of cases led. Table 4 presents regression results. Column
(1) repeats the results of Table 3 Column (7) regarding the number of cases disposed
of according to the most complete specication. The dependent variable in Column
(2) is the number of cases led by judge. This indicates that due to the reform and
accounting for common time e¤ects, levels of district development and respect for law
and order, no extra cases were in fact led before the same judge. This suggests that
the reform a¤ected only the supply side of the judiciary and not its demand side18. As a
result, the impact on the overall duration required to treat a case is unambiguous. The
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dependent variable in Column (3) is the ratio of the total number of cases to be treated
(pending at the beginning of the period in addition to those already led) to the number
of cases disposed. This indicates the average time it takes to treat a case if we believe
the caseow management technique to be of the rst in, rst outtype. Thanks to the
reform, it takes 1.4 less years to treat a case. The dependent variable in Column (4) is
the ratio of the number of cases led to the number of cases disposed. This indicates the
average time it takes to treat a case if we consider the cases pending at the beginning of
the period to be so old and complicated that judges do not even bother examining them
(last in, rst outtype). It takes 1.1 less years to treat a case because of the reform.
Pakistans judicial reform appears to have a¤ected judges performance. Judges
dispose of 25 percent more cases because of it19. It takes one year less to treat a case in
a¤ected areas. This is a huge improvement considering it was taking approximately 2
years to treat any case on the 1st of January 2002 in subordinate courts. However, this
does not answer satisfactorily the criticism regarding incentives. Since the reform was
not accompanied by changes in incentives, training judges should not improve their
performance, if we assume that judges fully understand their incentives in the rst place.
Critics may argue that the increased performance visible in the data is simply due to
a Hawthorne e¤ect. Judges knew they were to be evaluated and increased their e¤ort
as a result. However, this papers objective is not to argue that this particular judicial
reform, consisting of teaching judges caseow management techniques, is e¤ective. Its
objective is rather to evaluate the impact of the judiciary on entrepreneurship. Variation
in judgesperformance provided by the reform is used only as a means to isolate the
impact of faster judiciaries on the security of property rights, demand for credit and
transition towards entrepreneurship.
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V Impact of the Reform on Entrepreneurship
This paper uses the spatial and temporal variation in a judicial reform a¤orded by the
"Access to Justice Programme" to estimate the impact of the reform on entrepreneur-
ship. As the reform was widely discussed and criticized in numerous newspaper articles
mentioned above, it is likely that individuals knew about this reform and that short-term
perceptions about the judiciary changed. This paper uses three consecutive rounds of the
Labour Force Surveys collected in 2000, 2002 and 2004. They include a random sample
of 370,000 individuals. It is interesting to note that the sample is not representative at
the district level. This is because a di¤erent sampling strategy was adopted in rural and
urban areas. In rural areas, the dataset is representative at the district level. In urban
areas, that is the countrys 14 self-representing cities20, randomization was applied
at the level of entire cities, which encompass several districts. The judicial reform was
implemented in the following districts: Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi South, West, East
and Central. It was thus implemented in three self-representing cites: Peshawar, Lahore
and Karachi.21. The dataset is thus representative at the level of districts in rural areas
and self-representing cities in urban areas. Using the weights provided in the dataset
allows us to have a representative dataset of the country as a whole.
The dataset contains a wealth of information on working conditions and rm char-
acteristics. We will examine the impact of the reform on the security of property rights
(particularly the occurrence of law and order situations preventing people from working,
written accounts keeping, proxying for presence in the o¢ cial sector and work location
as underlined in the theoretical section) and on credit demand22. These two mecha-
nisms explain why judicial reform has a¤ected entrepreneurship. I will thus examine
the reforms impact on the transition from unemployment and salaried work to being
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self-employed and an employer.
V.1 Method
A di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach has been adopted to alleviate concerns of non-
random programme placement, since it accounts for pre-existing systematic di¤erences
between a¤ected and non-a¤ected areas. The identication assumption is that there are
no common time e¤ects. I address this concern in three ways. First, I test this hypoth-
esis by looking at the evolution of outcomes before the reform, that is, between 2000
and 2002. A di¤erence in the evolution of outcomes before the reform would cast doubt
on the analysis since we could no longer argue that, had they not been a¤ected, agents
in a¤ected areas would have evolved in the same way as agents in non-a¤ected areas.
Second, I compare my results with the analysis restricting the sample to Pakistans 14
self-representing cities in order to have a better comparison group. Third, I account for
factors such as police strength so as to disentangle the reforms e¤ects from coincidental
evolution in police forces, number of cinemas by district, and these cinemas seating
capacities, so as to account for the overall development of a district. Additionally, I
include individual factors such as sex, age, education level (degree achieved), residence
status and migration history (that is, those living since birth in the same district as
opposed to those having migrated).
We will perform regressions of the form:
outcomeidt = d + t + 1reformd  2003 + 2reformd  2002 + xidt + zdt + uidt (2)
where i corresponds to agent i,d to district d, t to year t between 2001 and 2003. d is a
district xed e¤ect, t a time xed e¤ect. reformd is a dummy variable taking the value
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1 for the following self-representing cities: Peshawar, Lahore and Karachi. To perform a
di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis, this term must be interacted with the year in which the
reform is supposed to bear fruit (2003). I also include an interacted term between the
reform and the year 2002 to explicitly account for the common time e¤ects assumption.
Level terms are already included in the year and district xed e¤ects (a Reform variable
equal to 1 in the a¤ected districts is a linear combination of district dummies). xidt
are individual control variables, zdt are district control variables, uit are disturbance
terms. Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for concerns of
serial correlation [Bertrand et al, 2002]. District xed e¤ect account for district-specic
factors such as culture and geography. Year e¤ects capture common shocks such as
central amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure having occurred during the reform
as well as other centrally implemented policies. The coe¢ cient of interest is 1. The
coe¢ cient 2 should not be signicantly di¤erent from 0 if the common time e¤ects
assumption is to hold.
V.2 Results
Table 5 examines the relationship between the reform and the two mechanisms high-
lighted in the theoretical section that spur entrepreneurship. In Column (1), the depen-
dent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 in cases where the individual was prevented
from working the previous week due to a law and order situation23. As expected from
the theory, the reform, by increasing judicial speed and thus the discounted value of
punishment in cases of law and order disturbances, is associated with less such events.
However, the coe¢ cient is not signicant. In Column (2), I restrict the sample to the
14 self-representing cities. The reform is associated with a 10 percentage point reduc-
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tion in the likelihood of law and order disturbances preventing agents from working.
This e¤ect is economically signicant given that we know that the occurrence of such
events (conditional on being prevented from working) is 10 percent. In other words, the
reform eradicates such events. However, the sample size is small (708 agents) due to
the fact that I restricted it to agents having been prevented from working in the last
week. Column (3) includes individual controls such as sex, age, education level (degree
achieved), residence status and migration history (those living since birth in the same
district as opposed to those having migrated). The coe¢ cient remains similar, strength-
ening the belief that the identication strategy captures the reforms impact and not
that of omitted variables correlated with it. Column (4) includes district controls such as
the number of police stations by district, the number of cinemas by district and seating
capacities of cinemas by district. Again, the coe¢ cient remains similar. Testing these
specications, which show the reforms constant impact, allows us to conclude that the
identication strategy is robust. Additionally, in all the regressions the coe¢ cient of the
reform interacted with the year 2002 is always insignicant, providing direct evidence
that the common time e¤ects concern is not a major issue.
A falsication exercise would require looking at the impact of the judicial reform on
other reasons preventing people from working unlikely to be a¤ected by the reform. In
column (5), The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual
was prevented from working last week because of a personal reason (religious or social
activities or attending political gathering...). The judicial reform has no impact on the
occurrence of these activities, as expected24.
In Column (6) of Table 5, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to
1 where individual owners keep written accounts and in which we keep the complete
specication with year and district xed e¤ects and individual and district controls. The
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reform increases the likelihood of operating in the o¢ cial sector by 10 percentage points.
Again this is a signicant e¤ect considering that only 13 percent of the individual owners
keep written accounts. In Column (7), the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal
to 1 in cases where individuals work at home (that is in his or her own, a family, friend
or employers dwelling) as opposed to elsewhere (on the street, road, in the country
side, shop, business, o¢ ce, or in industry). The judicial reform is associated with a 0.7
percentage point decrease in the likelihood of working in someones dwelling, considering
that 11 percent of the population works in such locations. As expected from the theory,
the judicial reform, by facilitating rapid case disposal, increases security of property
rights, which could potentially translate into the reallocation of labour supply into more
productive activities. In Column (8), the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal
to 1 in cases where individuals arranged for nancial resources or applied for loans
or credit during the last year of searching for work. The reform is associated with a
0.03 percentage point increase in the probability of taking steps towards arranging for
nancial resources. Agents are more condent in their ability to obtain credit when
unemployed. If credit is obtained, a point regarding which I have no information, agents
would be able start businesses. However, the signicance of the coe¢ cient interacted
with year 2002 casts doubt on the analysis. The table shows that the two channels
through which the judiciary might a¤ect entrepreneurship are valid.
Table 6 examines the relationship between the reform and entrepreneurship. In
Column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual
answered yes to the following question: Last year, in looking for work, did you apply
for a permit or license to set up your own enterprise, such as a shop, business, farm
or service establishment (xed or mobile)? Or did you look for land, building, machin-
ery or equipment for setting up your own enterprise, such as a shop, business, farm
27
or service establishment (xed or mobile)?. The variable takes the value of 0 where
individuals took steps to nd a salaried job, such as applying to prospective employers,
checking worksites, farms, factories or marketplaces, answering advertisements or regis-
tering with Government or private employment agencies. The reform is associated with
a 12 percentage point increase in the likelihood of the unemployed taking such steps,
considering that only 5 percent of the unemployed took them25. In Column (2), the
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual answered yes to the
question Would you be available for self-employment if given the necessary resources &
facilities as opposed to full-time paid employment with government, private business or
industry, or other types of employment such as commissions, contracts or daily wages,
etc.?. The reform is associated with a 12 percentage point increase in the likelihood
of individuals being available for self-employment as opposed to salaried employment.
However, the signicant result obtained with the interaction of the reform and the year
2002 casts doubt on the analysis. In Column (3), the dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the individual, having been unemployed during the previous year,
is now an employer or his own (non-agricultural) account worker, as opposed to a reg-
ular paid employee with xed wages, a casual paid employee, a paid worker by piece
rate or work performed, or a paid non-family apprentice. This is a direct test of the
judicial reforms impact on transitions out of unemployment and into entrepreneurship.
The judicial reform increases the likelihood of transitioning from unemployment to be-
ing an employer or ones own account worker by 3 percentage points. This is a sizeable
e¤ect considering that 10 percent of the unemployed became their own employers or
own account workers the following year. Column (4) studies the transition from being
unemployed to being an employer. The e¤ect is small, due perhaps to the rarity of such
transitions. Column (5) studies the transition from being unemployed to becoming ones
28
own account worker and nds similar results.
Table 7 investigates the relationship between the reform and the transition to entre-
preneurship in various occupations. In Column (1), the dependent variable is a dummy
variable equal to 1 where the individual is his own (non-agricultural) account worker
(conditional on having been an employee a year ago), to 0 where he is a regular paid
employee with xed wage, a casual paid employee, a paid worker by piece rate or work
performed, a paid non-family apprentice, or employer (also conditional on having been
an employee the year previous). The results indicate that the judicial reform is asso-
ciated with a 37 percentage point increase in such transitions. However, not enough
observations have been kept for this result to have meaningful implications. Column
(2) studies the transition from being an employee to an employer or ones own account
worker. Results are similar. In Column (3), the dependent variable is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the individual is a employer or his own (non-agricultural) account worker
(conditional on having been an account worker the year previous). Results are presented
for the 14 self-representing cities in Pakistan. As predicted by the Banerjee and Newman
[1993] model, there are more transitions from being self-employed to being an employer
when the judiciary is more e¢ cient.
VI Conclusion
This paper has used a reform as a source of variation in judicial speed in order to
evaluate judiciariesimpact on entrepreneurship. Judicial slowness may reduce incentives
to start businesses by deteriorating the security of property rights. It may also limit
possibilities of obtaining loans. Finding ways to speed up judiciaries is thus fundamental
to economic growth. In 2002 Pakistan implemented a programme of delay reduction
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called the Access to Justice Reform. Caseow management techniques were taught to
judges in 6 out of 117 pilot districts with the explicit objective of facilitating rapid
case disposal. By using a panel dataset of the performance of Pakistans 875 judges
between 2001 and 2003 within a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis, this paper has shown
that judges disposed of 25 percent more cases after the reform in a¤ected districts.
This spatial and temporal variation in the judiciarys speed was then used to evaluate
its impact on entrepreneurship in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis. The three rounds
of the Pakistan Labour Force Surveys, collected in 2000, 2002 and 2004 and containing
extremely detailed data on entrepreneurship, have allowed us to test the two mechanisms
through which judiciaries a¤ect entrepreneurship. The judicial reform eliminated law
and order situations preventing people from working, a reason cited by 10 percent of the
population when prevented from working. This may spur entrepreneurship by creating
conditions favorable to business and by improving entrepreneurscondence that their
workforce will not to be prevented from working due to law and order situations. Addi-
tionally, the willingness of the job-seeking unemployed to arrange for nancial resources
or to apply for loans almost doubled in a¤ected as opposed to non-a¤ected districts,
before and after the reform. Individuals were more condent in their ability to obtain
credit when unemployed. These two mechanisms spurred entrepreneurship. The pro-
portion of previously unemployed people applying for permits or looking for the land,
building, machinery or equipment necessary to start their own businesses tripled due to
the reform. This translated into a one third increase in transitions from unemployment
to being ones own employer or account worker. There was a similar increase in the
number of transitions from employee to employer or independent account worker.
I have addressed this concern in three ways. First, I explicitly tested this assumption
by looking at the evolution of judgesperformance and individualsbehavior in a¤ected
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and non-a¤ected areas one year before the reform was implemented. Second, the reform
placement was an explicit function of the extent of the local judiciarys slowness prior
to the reform. Thus, the estimate could potentially confound the e¤ects of the reform
with the mean reversion that would have taken place in its absence. An interacted term
between reform placement and the initial level of cases pending in 2001 is included in
the regressions to account for potential mean reversion. Third, the common time e¤ects
assumption is equivalent to the statement that there are no omitted time-varying and
district-specic e¤ects correlated with the reform. I have accounted for factors such
as police strength to disentangle the reforms e¤ect from any coincidental evolution in
police forces.
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Notes
1This is the wording used in the database (Labour Force Survey). This means inse-
curity preventing people from working.
2PAKISTAN: Focus on judicial delays, UN O¢ ce for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian A¤airs, Thursday 28 July 2005,IRINnews.org
3PAKISTAN: Focus on judicial delays, UN O¢ ce for the Coordination of Humani-
tarian A¤airs, Thursday 28 July 2005,IRINnews.org
4Pakistans Law and Justice Sector Reform Experience - Some Lessons, Livingston
Armytage, Centre for Judicial Studies, 13TH Commonwealth Law Conference, Mel-
bourne, 14 April 2003.
5The Pakistan Judicial Reform Project, Summer 2001, Livingston Armytage, The
Asia Foundation, http://nasje.unm.edu/archives/summer01/printable.htm#pakistan
6The reason behind this is a shortage of prisoner-vans and an inadequate number of
police sta¤ to escort prisoners.
7http://www.ajp.gov.pk/docs/Technical%20Reports/Integrated_DFR%20TA3015.pdf
This report argues that research on delay reduction has shown that the primary
obstacle to overcoming delay is the prevailing legal culture. Changing that culture and
the broader institutional reform that must accompany it, requires innovative solutions.
Pilot projects are a vital part of any large judicial reform programme seeking court
modernization. Comparative experience has shown that pilot projects serve the following
purposes: judiciaries develop tools to implement larger e¤orts; leaders are identied
and created; teamwork is developed; personnel is trained and exposed to comparative
experience; the costs of future reforms are more precisely determined, as is the time
needed to implement them and the obstacles to further reform; the risk of waste in
scaling-up reform e¤orts is reduced; and a vision of the change process is communicated
in concrete and active, rather than rhetorical, terms. During their rst two years of
operation, the pilot projects were extensively evaluated and rened for replication in
both medium and long term.
8The three treated criminal judges were spread in the three areas. There were
three treatedcivil judges in Karachi, three treatedcivil judges in Lahore and one
treatedcivil judge in Peshawar. Therefore no distinction can be made between civil
and criminal outcomes across districts.
9http://nasje.unm.edu/archives/summer01/printable.htm#pakistan
10Livingston Armytage notes that contrary to initial expectations of obvious di¤er-
ences between Pakistan and Singapore, participants found this experience particularly
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useful in providing a tool-kit of practical techniques, from which they selected, ex-
perimented and applied lessons learned in their own courts with some quite notable
successes.
11According to the past experiences of legal experts, all successful delay reduction
programmes begin with the creation of a Bench-Bar Coordinating Committee. A re-
form cannot be imposed upon the bar since the system ultimately requires voluntary
compliance.
12First, the reform aimed at improving access to Justice by translating laws into local
languages, examining barriers to womens entry into the judiciary and investigating free-
dom of information. Second, the reform included a judicial training aspect by enhancing
the institutional capacity of the Federal Judicial Academy and by developing bench-
books in law, court practice and civil and criminal court procedure for use by district
judges, written wherever possible by local judges selected for their expertise in particu-
lar subjects and designed as practice (and not theoretical) manuals to assist judges in
performing their judicial duties on a day-to-day basis. Third, the reform examined the
possibility of creating centres of excellence in legal education and strengthening the legal
profession through recommendations on admission requirements, disciplinary processes,
improved legal education and legal information, and the development and reform of laws
favouring a sustainable profession. Fourth, awareness of institutions was to be improved
and commercial dispute resolution procedures were to be strengthened. Fifth, a modern
system of judicial statistics was designed and Annual Reports were to be published by
each Superior Court. Sixth, legal experts amended the Civil Procedure Code and High
Court Rules on measures reducing levels of court delay, both in High and Subordinate
Courts.
13The system in short, Can the expensive Access to Justice Programme make the
dispensation of justice more e¤ective?By Adnan Mahmood, Special report, The News
International.
14It is also interesting to note that the reform was widely discussed and criticized. It is
therefore likely that individuals knew about this reform and that short-term perceptions
about the judiciary changed.
15p. 269, Final Report on Delay Reduction Pilot Courts Pakistan, Delay Reduction
Report, Section 2: Technical Reports, Carl Baar, Political Science Professor from York
University, Canada.
16Note that the interacted term (Number of cases pending at the beginning of 2001 per
judge)*(placement of the reform) cannot be included anymore as it is a linear function
of judge dummies.
17Remember that the standard errors are always clustered at the district level.
18This calls for a longer term exploration of the reforms impact. It could be argued
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that when the judiciary improves its e¢ ciency, people will seek judicial help in the belief
that help will be forthcoming. When people realise they can have greater condence in
the judiciary, we should see an increase in cases led.
19According to the preferred specication, a trainedjudge will dispose of 166 more
cases. Pakistani judges disposed of on average 720 cases per year between 2001 and
2003.
20This is the wording used in the database (Labour Force Survey). This means the
14 biggest cities of Pakistan. These cities constitute a separate stratum, hence the word
self-representing. These are: Lahore, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, Multan,
Sialkot, Sargodha, Bahawalpur in Punjab; Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur in Sindh; Pe-
shawar in North West Frontier Province; Quetta in Balochistan and Islamabad (capital
city).
21This is because the only 4 districts in Karachi are: Karachi South, Karachi West,
Karachi East, Karachi Central.
22An interested test would be to look at the di¤erent civil or criminal outcomes ac-
cording to the treatedjudgesarea of expertise. However, the three treatedcriminal
judges were spread in the three areas. There were three treatedcivil judges in Karachi,
three treatedcivil judges in Lahore and one treatedcivil judge in Peshawar. There-
fore no distinction can be made between civil and criminal outcomes across treated
districts.
23Other reasons preventing agents from working are illness, injury, strike, bad weather
and mechanical breakdown.
24Other reasons preventing people from working are: illness or injury; strike or lockout;
holiday, ramzan, vacation or leave of absence; o¤-season inactivity; due to bad weather,
due to mechanical breakdown, due to shortage of raw material; educational and training
leave; maternity or parental leave; reductions in economic activity. I found no e¤ect of
the judicial reform on these outcomes. Regressions available on request.
25I did not nd any e¤ect of the reform on other steps taken during the last year in
search of work.
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Appendix 1: Delay Reduction project (from Project Completion Report, Action Plan
on Delay Reduction, Section2 Technical Reports):
DELAY REDUCTION PROCESSES
A. Inventory of pending cases
The next stage in the process is to conduct a comprehensive inventory of all pending
cases in each pilot court site. This inventory should provide a listing by date of ling
from oldest to newest of all the cases in the court. The listing should also indicate the
date of last time there was some legal process that occurred in the case and the nature
of the legal action that occurred. Cases where there has not been any legal action for
more than a year will be placed in a separate category labeled inactive.
B. Special calendar for older cases
The pilot courts should establish a special calendar every week dedicated to dispo-
sition of the older cases. The calendar should foster dispositions in the cases that are
pending. In those cases where the parties indicate that they intend to continue the
litigation process, the court should discuss what steps are necessary to bring to closure
the case. These steps should be memorialized and agreed to in writing by the attorneys
with the court. If the parties cannot agree to a course of action for the resolution of
the case, the court can order the case be placed on the inactive status until the moving
party indicates a plan for resolution of the case.
The conclusion of the calendar call in each of the pending cases should result in one of
the following dispositions(1.) judgment based on settlement; (2.) a schedule with dates
for preparation for a single trial date;(3.) a subsequent hearing date where the case will
be dismissed if the parties are not ready to proceed;(4.) another hearing date where the
litigants provide an update regarding the problems of nding a party or witness.
C. Classication of cases introduction of case tracks
The age of the caseload is the barometer of the e¤ectiveness of the caseow manage-
ment system. Consideration should be given to grouping the pending cases according to
those which are the easiest to conclude. In order to determine this condition the pilot
courts are going to require assistance from the Registrars o¢ ce.
D. Resources allocation of responsibilities to sta¤
Each of the pilot court programs requires a person to provide full time services.
The Registrars o¢ ce is primary locus for support for the courts. A person should be
designated to assist the PSCs, the Supervising District Judge and the Pilot Judges in
the administration of the project. This person will develop the statistical data base
for measuring the progress of the project, assist with the coordination with the Bar,
provide communications with the community, coordinate the delivery and installation of
equipment in the pilot courts, and maintain close daily contact with all the stakeholders
in the project.
F. Timelines and schedules
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The project will conduct further workshops for participants of the pilot projects each
three months, commencing in September. This will involve developing 4 sets of plans
each lasting for 90 days over the next twelve months. At each quarterly meeting the
pilot courts will review their progress to date and make revisions accordingly. In this
manner the projects can take advantage of the evolving nature of the process.
WORK PLAN FOR PILOT COURT JUDGES AT LAHORE
Under the given circumstances the pilot courts at Lahore shall try to improve their
output and reduce the delay in the disposal by adopting following measures.
1. Presiding O¢ cer shall himself x the cases for daily cause diary.
2. In the daily cause diary, date of institution of each case shall be written against
it so that while dealing with the cases on the xed date the old cases remain in notice
of the court.
3. Cause list should be balanced.
4. While preparing daily cause diary following points shall be kept in mind:
a) Number of cases to be xed
b) Nature of cases
c) Fixing of cases keeping in mind how much time di¤erent cases are likely to
take
d) Old and commercial cases shall take priority.
5. Before leaving the court, the Presiding O¢ cer shall have a glance at the cases
xed for the next day to chalk out a strategy as to how to deal with them. In such a
manner the old cases, the cases of commercial nature and other cases requiring early
disposal shall be given special attention.
6. If miscellaneous applications are moved the presiding o¢ cer shall not stay the
main suit. The proceeding of the suit shall continue and for disposal of application short
adjournments shall be given.
7. In cases where it is permissible under Rule 10A of Order 5 CPC, the summons
shall be sent by registered post A/D, and subject to provision of Rule 20 substituted
service shall be ordered.
8. For e¤ecting service of the witnesses who are to be served through court,
summons shall be sent through the process-serving agency and through registered letter
with acknowledgment card through post to ensure service.
9. Coercive measures like attachment of salary and issuance of warrants can also
be adopted, where the witnesses fail to attend court despite the service of summons to
him/her.
10. Adjournments shall not be granted unnecessarily.
11. Following provisions of C.P.C. shall be put to use in order to eliminate pro-
cedural delay:-
a) Order X C.P.C. (examination of Parties)
b) Order XI C.P.C (Discovery and inspection)
c) Order XII C.P.C. (Admissions)
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d) Order XV C.P.C. (Disposal of suit at rst hearing)
e) Order XIV Rule 4 C.P.C (Examination of parties before framing issues).
f) Order XIV Rule 2 C.P.C. (Framing of preliminary issue on question of law and
decide it rst)
g) Order 8 rule 9 C.P.C. (Court can ask both parties to submit subsequent plead-
ings.
h) Order 6, Rule 5 C.P. C (Better statement of parties)
12. Under section 30 C.P.C., the court can suo moto make such order as may be
necessary or reasonable in all matters relating to the delivery and answering of inter-
rogatories, the admission of documents and facts and the discovery and inspection.
13. It shall be ensured that all documents in possession of the plainti¤ and de-
fendant or on which they rely are attached and relied by them so that on the rst date
of hearing for settlement of issues, the court may be in a position to frame issues to start
with the trial out wastage of time. (Relevant Provisions: Order 5, Rule 3; Order 7, Rule
14; Order 8, Rule 1 and Order 13, Rule 1 C.P.C)
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Figure I: Mean Number of Cases Disposed in Treated Districts (Square) as Opposed to the
Mean Number of Cases Disposed in Non-Treated Districts (Triangle) Between 2001 and 2003.
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Figure II: Mean Number of Cases Filed in Treated Districs (Square) as Opposed to the Mean
Number of Cases Filed in Non-Treated Districts (Triangle) Between 2001 and 2003.
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